The Elena Panaritis Show has been cancelled…is future syndication possible?

Greece is now casting around for a new Representative to the IMF (Executive Director) following the announcement June 1 that former nominee Elena Panaritis is withdrawing her candidacy for the position after a weekend of intensely negative reaction in SYRIZA’s ranks. From a statement she issued Monday: “I did not ask for this position and given that I accepted it only because I felt that I could help the government with my experience of how the IMF works, it is impossible for me to accept the appointment when there is a negative reaction from SYRIZA MPs and members.”

Just a few points need to be made.  Ms. Panaritis was clearly one of Greece’s most qualified potential candidates for this slot. Her knowledge of that rare dialect spoken at International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and IMF was unmatched.  If another dozen Greek citizens could be found with expertise at roughly equivalent levels, they would likely have served in those institutions previously. It is doubtful other candidates would have had anything close to her wide background in structural reform issues.

So why was such a knowledgeable and media-savvy candidate a problem for so many in SYRIZA?  First, as a World Bank economist notably having led property rights reform in Peru, she could speak the language of reform, not the language of “reform rollback” that most SYRIZA officials sincerely believe they are elected to oversee.   So she was instantly in conflict with the core values of the government she would have been sent to represent. Second, as a nominee of Finance Minister Varoufakis, she was automatically suspect by all those who mistrust him.  Finally, as an economist who had served both the current SYRIZA government (most recently in the Brussels Group) and in George Papandreou’s government (MP at-large), she was clearly seen as an outsider (similar to Varoufakis) and probably fatally, as a “Memorandum supporter.”  Clearly, “structural reform” remains a dirty word in Greece, unless spoken in that special Syrizan-dialect that does not include the words “cutback,” “performance” or “fiscal restraint.”

This turn of events also further indicates the dysfunction of SYRIZA as a cohesive political party.  Cobbled together from a myriad set of alliances, smaller political Marxist-oriented parties, and disaffected Socialists, SYRIZA was only recently judicially recognized to have standing in national elections as a political party.  In coming to terms with SYRIZA, one must understand that this is a political party that is unable to speak with one voice.

How to ‘Tsipras-Proof’ Greece’s reform program and its accomplishments

 

With Greece’s elections upon us and the spectre of “the day after” ever closer, the team at Reform Watch Greece (RWG), clearly no supporters of the reform record of the current government, has reconvened to lay out a few of its ideas.  As the title of this note suggests, RWG believes the path of structural reform more or less laid out by the Troika offers one of the few workable paths forward for Greece at this time.  Of course a reform plan developed here in country and agreed by the population would be far more acceptable, but for reasons specific to Greece which could fill several articles, this kind of program or consensus hasn’t emerged.  But the lack of a Greek alternative is no reason to reject other reform programs.

We produced these ideas because we want to make it clear that no matter who wins the January 25 elections, we believe that softening the Troika’s positions on the core elements of the Greek reform program would be a major tragedy for this country.  There is no question that the majority of Greeks want the country to remain in the Eurozone; our view is that the election will show what percentage of the population is willing to support a risky attempt to cut a better deal, which implies increased external financial support for Greece in some mode but doesn’t answer many other questions about how funds would be found.  Domestically, that essentially translates into reducing taxes (see below) and otherwise accelerating the pace of visible improvements in the Greek populace’s daily lives, because in essence many haven’t seen any change flowing from structural reform other than a spate of new taxes in the last 24-36 months, which have allowed for Greece’s dramatic fiscal consolidation.   As this leaves most Greek families in a state of slow decapitalization with no clear upside, it is not surprising that a sense of desperation has fed radical politics/reform fatigue and boosted the acceptance of radical solutions here.

This note is not intended as a full playbook, but here are several of the key policy parameters Greece’s negotiating partners should expect to encounter:

1. Zero Reform Rollback (ZRR): This is the bottom line. What Greece actually needs is reform acceleration to make up for lost time since the great pre-Euro-election slowdown in early 2014. It is clear that a SYRIZA single-party government would attempt to move immediately and unilaterally to consolidate its popularity/political base through enacting legislation to reverse certain reforms already in place, along with the associated chest-thumping about the “powerless” Troika paymasters. A coalition government would need time to agree on a platform; accordingly such action would be much slower in that scenario. If market signals and domestic cash flow constraints aren’t enough to bring moderation to the new leaders, the Eurogroup and Greece’s allies need to make it clear that any attempt to roll back Troika-initiated reforms or refloat Greece’s public sector will trigger immediate sanctions and jeopardize discussions on both Greece’s debt as well as prospects for closing out/extending the current Troika bailout program. Because of the mixed messages coming from Europe up to now, SYRIZA officials continue to talk confidently to domestic audiences as though Greece’s partners are merely bluffing and have acquiesced to the inevitable. While some of this is show it appears to many as if this is the final SYRIZA position.
2. It’s Amateur Hour: Greece’s interlocutors will immediately notice a different calibre of politician in the mix. Although many key SYRIZA officers have credible (although not world-class) academic credentials, by and large the new team does not have corporate board/private sector experience or previous international financial institution assignments. Without this depth of experience, a SYRIZA-led Greek government team will immediately be shown to be at a disadvantage in international negotiations, and out of necessity extremely cautious in moving discussions forward. Although good at spinning the Greek press, the long-winded academic approach of the SYRIZA economic advisers that we that have seen to-date might well put the focused western negotiators or the journalists they encounter to sleep.
3. Undeniable Debt Unsustainability (UDU) is the new dogma: There can be no discussion of Greece’s economic situation with a SYRIZA official without the subject of “Greece’s unsustainable debt” being broached in the first minute. A lecture on Europe’s “immorality” in lending to Greece will follow shortly. The party essentially has no unifying core ideology beyond the demand for an upfront write-down of Greece’s debt, although as of late it seems an election-period decision has been taken not to demand such a write-off for Greek debts owed to the IMF or ECB (which would never even allow the subject to be raised). Accordingly there is still no room in SYRIZA’s thinking for maturity extensions, longer grace periods, long-term interest rate cuts and the like on the debts Greece now owes to its Eurozone partners – mostly channelled to the so-called Greek Loan Facility (GLF) and the EFSF (approximately 197 billion Euros). The Greek side will talk tough in public while quietly approaching its partners and explaining the “humanitarian emergency” facing the country. Accepting that Greece’s debt can be engineered onto a sustainable trajectory when combined with continued growth-catalysing structural reform — without the demanded write-down — may be the ultimate result of a prolonged negotiation with the Troika, but it will cost SYRIZA its ideological core. However, once it is made clear to the SYRIZA policy team that insisting on its preferred alternative (an upfront write-down) to this is financial disaster for Greece, we have no doubt an arrangement can be made. Be prepared for intense maneuvering: the Greek side will work furiously to exploit every signal from Eurozone member states and elsewhere that appears to indicate there might be the slightest flexibility on the matter.
4. Privatization efforts cannot remain frozen in time: We continue to believe the privatization program will be the major channel for foreign investment into Greece for the next years. Although many if not most Greeks would prefer to side-line the issue, we believe targets should remain in place which will keep the Greek government focused tightly on these projects in order to raise budget revenue. However, we have witnessed a tendency for the Greek government to relax ethical standards in order to reach a deal at any price in the small group of sales that have progressed. In a number of these cases, companies run by Greek oligarchs, who are not immediately driven away by the almost-impenetrable Greek bureaucracy (as many foreign investors are), tend to take prominent roles. At a minimum, tighter monitoring of the suitability of potential investors is required.
5. The Bank of Greece is sacrosanct: The Eurogroup and especially the ECB should remind the new Greek government to respect the full independence of the Bank of Greece Governor. Prior to the election campaign Mr Tsipras levelled substantial criticism at the appointment of former Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras as Governor, probably because he would be immune to SYRIZA pressures once installed. The ECB must warn Mr Tsipras off this tactic and make it clear that no SYRIZA attempts to undermine Governor Stournaras or the Bank of Greece’s critical role in financial policy making will be tolerated.
6. It’s all about the Primary Surplus: The Greek population has been demanding tax policy changes and protesting loudly about some form of “austerity” or against important reforms since time immemorial, so there is relatively little new other than the breadth of the protest since the current fiscal consolidation began in 2010. However, it is important to deal with Greece’s current long-term requirement, imposed by the Eurogroup, to generate and maintain a large primary budget surplus; flexibility here is critical. These targets were set in the run-up to the November 2012 Eurogroup marathon discussions on the Greek program, after the completion of Greece’s private sector debt restructuring (PSI). From 2016-2017, Greece is obligated to run a primary surplus of 4.5% of GDP, with some flexibility to drop this number slightly in 2018 and beyond. We believe this primary surplus target is politically unsustainable, and said so at the time the decision was made. In fact the current elections might be seen as proof of this theory, and the primary surplus has not yet reached 3% of GDP (Latest estimate is 2.7% for 2014). We recommend this budgetary target be reviewed with an eye to an immediate reduction to a more sustainable surplus level, provided reforms proceed, which of course is the underlying requirement for all the Eurogroup decisions. In our view the primary surplus reduction should be keyed to Greece’s debt service repayment requirements, which in all likelihood can be sharply reduced if maturities are extended and interest rates further lowered.

In sum, we think a deal with a SYRIZA-led government might be built around these elements: (A) Reducing Greece’s primary surplus obligation, allowing for somewhat more social spending, but not rehiring in the public sector, and an earnest opening to privatization. It is of course understood that programs for job creation in the private sector will be given priority in future development planning. (B) Extension of Greece’s repayment periods to Eurozone countries (GLF/EFSF) and lower interest rates on all official debt where still possible;  (C) Specific reform requirements/benchmarks to be achieved for each year’s interest rate reductions to be certified, providing a clear budgetary incentive to fully implement reforms.

Austerity without Justice

Austerity, yes! Justice, maybe

In a few hours we will know whether fear trumped rage in this latest round of Greece’s election drama.

Were the European leaders and bankers right in threatening Greeks with the direst of consequences should they support openly anti-Troika parties?

Was the Global Left, Occupy Wall Street and the “austerity hurts” crowd closer to the point – that Greece could not and should not be subjected to more of the pain of structural adjustment?

Does it matter?

The implementation of Greece’s reform program has three major hallmarks:

–Little or no domestic constituency for reform

–Underperformance on agreed targets at almost every juncture

–Confusion about Greece’s administrative capacity to undertake reforms

At least up to the present, limited penalties were imposed by the Troika for Greece’s sustained underperformance on reform targets.  So in a perverse way, underperformance has paid off and kept the cash flowing in.  Look at the so-called “closed professions” and see how little has changed.  For example, recall how the IMF’s debt sustainability reports for Greece were revised almost monthly last year to make the case for a deeper haircut at each juncture, yielding Greece more debt relief at each new stage of the discussion.

We suggest that the majority of the Greek people are reacting normally to a structural reform program that has few if any visible “up front” benefits.  Building a domestic constituency for reform will be a long process, but up to now the issue has been a clear lack of justice, giving the population no stake.  Tax increases alienated a large segment of the population early on.  Finally, horizontal cuts in wages and pensions, a choice made by the Papandreou-led PASOK government itself, spread the pain across many layers of Greek society instead of the appropriate target, the bloated public sector.  The Troika should not have accepted PASOK’s “job-preservation is paramount” arguments, since this shifted the pain of adjustment heavily onto the already overburdened private sector and hastened the collapse in economic activity, while barely reducing the Greek state’s revenue requirements.

This could be changed, and quickly, if leaders decided that the missing sense of justice would be addressed as a priority.   Any of these ideas could have been attempted in the last two years and would have reduced the rage we are seeing today, in addition to producing some visible evidence that things could change for the better and that crime did not pay.

Ideas include: 

–Effective prosecution of the corrupt political and business elite based on a reformed judicial system. But in the meantime, set up special tribunals focusing on public procurement scandals.

–Repair and extensive modernization of the taxation system, allegedly ALWAYS underway, to include use of foreign advisors in the debt collection process.

–Re-evaluation of politicians’ asset declarations.  Moving the “look-back” period on these assets to 1974, as many are proposing.

–High priority auditing of public sector jobs so the downsizing and mergers of public sector organizations can be accelerated.  Prosecution of those found to have made hiring decisions based on political criteria as well as fast-track removal of the individuals illegally hired from those jobs, with pension benefits cancelled.

–Thorough scrutiny of all offshore business activities linked to Greece, via special tribunals.

The skeptics will say these ideas are politically unacceptable. We suggest they focus pain where it should be focused, so to demonstrate to the Greek people that unavoidable austerity (at least for the short-term) can be implemented with some sense of justice, social responsibility and reform.

Greece Needs Deeper Reforms to Overcome Crisis – IMF Survey and Report

Merry Christmas Mr Papademos!

First and foremost – No new taxes!

Note to readers:  this site will not specialize in Greek debt issues – we are all about advancing reform here.  That’s why it is essential that you read the IMF survey article which includes a link to the IMF Report dated December 13th, entitled: Fifth Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, Rephasing and Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Greece.

For most purposes, the IMF Survey article is adequate, but you can go further and review the entire documentation stream that supported the release of the IMF’s share of the sixth tranche of the Troika bailout package. It makes quite sobering reading.

Here are a few relevant quotes from Poul Thomsen, IMF Mission Chief for Greece:

“Structural reforms have not yet delivered expected results, in part because agreed reforms are not being implemented. For instance, two flagship reforms—on collective bargaining and liberalizing restricted professions—have yet to deliver substantial results.”

“Progress has been made on many fronts but there is still a long way to go. Greece is still far away from the critical mass of reforms needed to transform the investment climate,”

Finally, Thomsen also noted in the press conference on the report’s release that delays in reform implementation are one crucial reason why investor sentiment has not recovered as expected under the program, and thus why the economy was weaker than expected.

Link:

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/CAR121611A.htm

Greek crisis divides IMF opinion – Business 360 – CNN.com Blogs

Greek crisis divides IMF opinion – Business 360 – CNN.com Blogs.